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CAMPBELL

JOHN

C.2d

IVA LEE CAMPBELL, as

Contracts-Breach-Remedi.es.-One who has been injured by
breach
contract as rescinded and recover
he has
; or he may keep
of both
at all times
noet'n,rm ; or he may treat repudiation as
for all purposes of performance,
he would have realized if he had not been
Agency- Contractual Liabilities of Principal to Agent.-If
y···.-··y~·, in violation of contract of employment, terminates
or
or agent properly terminates it
because of breach of contract by principal, agent is entitled at
his election to receive either amount of net losses caused and
principal's breach or, if there are no such
losses or
a small sum as nominal damages; or reasonable
value of services previously rendered by principal, not limited
by contract price,
that for services for which a price
is apportioned by
of contract he is entitled to receive
contract price and no more.
[3] Attorneys-Compensation-Amount-Reasonable Fee.-In entire
attorney for fixed fee, when client
attorney before he has completed conattorney may recover reasonable value of services performed to time of
[ 4] Master and Servant- Remedies for Wrongful DischargeAmount of Recovery.-One who is wrongfully discharged from
employment and
from further performance of his
contract may elect as a general rule to treat contract as rescinded, may sue on a quantum me~·uit as if special contract of
See Cal.Jur.2d,
§ 253; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 388.
See Cal.Jur.2d,
§ 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Agency,
§ 292 et seq.
Contract
as limit of attorney's recovery on quantum
meruit in event of his discharge without fault on his part, note,
109 A.L.R. 674. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 181;
Am.Jur.,
at
§ 195 et seq.
McK.
Contracts. ~ 249; [2] Agency, § 158;
Attorneys, § 108;
l\Iaster and Servant, § 41; [5] Work
and Labor, § 45;
§ 12
Assumpsit, § 7; [8, 9]
Attorneys, § 114; [10] Attorneys,
117, 129.
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employment had never been
recover reasonable
value of services
value exceeds contract price.
[5] Work and Labor-Evidence-Contract Price.-Where recovery
is sought on quantum
employment, contract
reasonable value of
[6] Assumpsit-Pleading.-~Inherent
count in quantttm meruit where

but has been prevented from
repudiation of contract, is
contract or its repudiation and
[7] !d.-Effect of Express Contract-Contract Fully Performed.A common count may be used where only thing that remains
to be done is payment of money due on express contract.
[8] Attorneys-Compensation-Actions- Restitution.-In action
by attorney to recover reasonable value of services rendered
to client before attorney's discharge from employment under
an express contract, rule that plaintiff should restore or offer
to restore part payment for services which client had made
is not necessary where plaintiff would be entitled to it in any
event.
[9] !d.-Compensation-Actions- Restitution.-Where attorney,
suing for reasonable value of services rendered to client in
divorce case, had performed practically all services he was
employed to perform when he was discharged by client, and
where court in that case had indicated its intention to give
judgment against such client and all that remained was the
signing of findings and judgment,
rule is that remedy
of restitution in money is not available to one who has fully
performed his part of contract, if only part of agreed exchange for such performance that has not been rendered by
defendant is sum of money constituting a liquidated debt, but
that full performance does not make restitution unavailable
if any part of consideration due from defendant in return is
something other than a liquidated debt; in such eases he recovers full contract price and no more.
[10] !d.-Compensation-Pleading: Judgment.-While it may be
for reasonable value of
more appropriate for attorney,
services rendered to client in divorce case
to his discharge from employment under an express contract, to allege
that price of such services was contract
auy deficiency
of pleading is eliminated
defendant's ans>ver
forth
that factor and action can thus be said to be common count
indebitatus assumpsit, and there being no dispute as to amount
called for in contract, the services
been in effect fully
performed, court should render judgment for balance due on
contract.
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Brett Smithers for Appellant.

Shoemaker and

0. Smith for Respondent.

CARTER, J.-Plaintiff
from a judgment for defendant, administratrix of the estate of Roy Campbell, de's fees.
ceased, in an action for
Plaintiff's cause of action was stated in a common count
alleging that Roy Campbell became indebted to him in the
sum of $10,000, the reasonable value of services rendered as
attorney for Campbell; that no part had been paid except
$450. Campbell died after the services were rendered by
plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a claim against his estate for the
fees which defendant rejected. Defendant in her answer denied the allegations made and as a ''further'' defense alleged
that plaintiff and Campbell entered into an "express written
contract'' employing plaintiff as attorney for a stated fee of
$750, and all work alleged to have been performed by plaintiff
was performed under that contract.
According to the
of the trial court the claim
against the estate was founded on the alleged reasonable
value of legal services rendered by plaintiff for Campbell
in an action for separate maintenance by defendant, Campbell's wife, against Campbell and in which the latter crosscomplained for a divorce. Plaintiff was not counsel when
the pleadings in that action were filed. He came into the
case on December 16, 1949, before trial of the action. He
and Campbell entered into a written contract on that date
for plaintiff's representation of Campbell in the action, the
contract stating that plaintiff agrees to represent Campbell
in the separate maintenance and divorce action which has been
set for trial in the superior court for a "total fee" of $750
plns court costs and other incidentals in the sum of $100 making a total of
The fees were to be paid after trial.
Plaintiff represented
at the trial consuming 29 days
and lasting until :IVIay, 1950. (Defendant's complaint for
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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rl'he findings in the divorce action
Plaintiff's services
furnished
The reasonable value of the services was
paid $450 to
and the
costs.
The court concluded that
should take nothing
because neither his claim
the estate nor his action
was on the contract but were in
rnerttit and no
recovery could be had for the reasonable value of the services
because the compensation for those services was covered by
the express contract.
According to plaintiff's
Campbell
told him after defendant had offered proposed findings in
the divorce action that he was dissatisfied with plaintiff as
his counsel and would discharge him and asked him if he
would sign a substitution of
under which Campbell
would represent himself. Plaintiff replied that he recognized
Campbell had a right to discharge him but that he was prepared to carry the case to conclusion; that he expected to
be paid the reasonable value of his services which would be
as much as defendant's counsel in the divorce action received,
$9,000, to which Campbell
he was not going to pay
"a cent more." (At that time Campbell had paid $450.)
Thereupon the substitution (dated January 25, 1951) was
signed and Campbell took plaintiff's file in the divorce case
with him.
It seems that the contract of employment contemplated
that plaintiff was to continue his services and representation
at least until and including final judgment in the divorce
action. (See Neblett v. Getty, 20 Cal.App.2d 65 [66 P.2d
473] .) It might thus appear that plaintiff was discharged
before he had fully completed his services under the contract
and the discharge prevented him from completing his performance. (That question is later discussed.)
One alleged rule of law applied by the trial court and that
urged by defendant is that where there is a contract of
employment for a definite term which fixes the compensation, there cannot be any recovery for the reasonable value
of the services even though the employer discharges the em-

C.2d
term;
an action on the
for the breach
that theory and
plaintiff did not
for damages for
the services
there
was wrongcontract by
breach of it, or whether
at the time of this
The rule
in accord with the general contract
law. the law
to
contracts or employment
an
client. [1] 'l'he general rule is
stated: ''.
who has been injured by a breach of
c-ontract has an election to pursue any of three remedies, to
wit: 'He may treat the eontraet as rescinded and may recover
upon a
meruit so far as he has performed; or he
may keep the contract
for the benefit of both parties,
being at all times
and able to perform; or, third, he may
treat the
putting an end to the contract for
a11 purposes of
and sue for the profits he would
have realized if he had not been preyented from performing.' "
(Alder
Drudis, 30 Cal.2d 372, 381 [182 P.2d 195] ; see 12
Cal.Jnr
§
; Hest. Contracts, § 347.) It is
the same in agency or contract for services cases. [2] "If
the principal, in Yiolation of the contract of employment,
terminates or repudiates the employment, or the agent properly terminates it beeause of breach of contract by the principaL the agent is entitled at his election to receive either:
''
the amount of the net losses caused and gains prevented
the principal's breach or, if there are no such
a small sum as nominal damages; or
losses or
'' (b) the reasonable Yalue of the services previously rendered the principal, not limited by the contract price, except
that for services for which a price is apportioned by the terms
of the contract he is entitled to receiye the contract price and
no more.
''Comment:
''a. In no event is the agent entitled to compensation for
servic:es unperformed. If, however, the principal terminates
the relationship in breach of contract, or if the agent chooses
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to terminate it because of a
at his
the agent is
r~ontract.
If he affirms the

rule 8tated in Clause
the contract
the
way of restitution.
states the con8equences of disaffirmance
bility of restitution a8 a
where
been completed, for which
been apportioned." (Rest. Agency, § 455.)
rendered consists of services, there cannot
from the
nature of legal remedies, be actual
but it is possible to give the equivalent in value under a common count.
Since money paid may be thus recovered and similarly in
the United States in many
would require such a remedy; and it is allowed :in
but only in
part. If the plaintiff bas fully
the
or a
severable part thereof, and 'if the only
of the agreed
exchange for such performance that has not been rendered
by the defendant is a sum of money
a liquidated
sum,' the only redress he has for breach of contract by the
other side is damages for the breach. It is true that if the
performance to which he is entitled in return is a liquidated
sum of money, he may sue in indebitatus
and not
on the special contract, but the measure of damages is what
he ought to have received--not the value of what he has
given. If, however, the plaintiff has only partly performed
and has been excused from further
prevention
or by the repudiation or abandonment of the contraet by the
defendant, he may recover, either in England or America,
the value of the services rendered, though such a remedy is
no more necessary than where he has fully performed, since
in both cases alike the plaintiff has an effectual remedy in an
action on the contract for damages. In some jurisdictions,
if a price or rate of compensation is fixed
the contract,
that is made the conclusive test of the value of the serviees
rendered. More frequently, however, the plaintiff is allowed
to recover the real value of the services though in excess of
the contract price. The latter rule seems more in accordance
with the theory on which the right of action must be based-

[43 C.2d
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and the plaintiff reas possible.'' (WillisHaub v. Coustette,
, contract
less reasonable
allowed; Blair v. Brownstone
394
P. 160], dictum;
630
P.
; Laiblin v.
516 [213 P. 529]; Willis1485; Corbin on Contracts,
164 Cal. 160 [128 P.
29]; Davidson v.
138 Cal. 320
P. 345, 5 L.R.A.
N.S. 579] ; Brown
Ct·own Gold JJ!illing Co., 150 Cal. 376
[ 89 P. 86].)
And in entire contracts employing an attorney for a
fee it has been said that when the client
wrongfully
the attorney before he has completed
the contract, the
may recover the reasonable value
of the services performed to the time of discharge. (Neblett
v. Getty, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d
dictum; Lessing v. Gibbons, 6 Cal.App.2d 598 [45 P.2d 258]; ll!cMantts v. Montgomery, 12 Cal.2d 397 [84 P.2d 787], dictum; Echlin v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 368 [90 P.2d 63, 124 A.L.R. 719],
dictum; Kirk v.
202 Cal. 501 [261 P. 994]; Ayres v.
Lipschutz, 68 Cal.App. 134 [228 P. 720] ; 109 A.L.R. 674.)
Inasmuch as the contract has been repudiated by the employer
before its term is up and after the employee has partly performed and the employee may treat the contract as "rescinded,'' there is no longer any contract upon which the employer can rely as fixing conclusively the limit of the compensation-the reasonable value of services recoverable by
the employee for his part performance. [ 4] Hence it is
stated in Lessing v. Gibbons, supra, 6 Ca1.App.2d 598, 607,
that : "It is well settled that one who is wrongfully discharged
and prevented from further performance of his contract may
elect as a general rule to treat the contract as rescinded,
may sue upon a quanturn rnm·uit as if the special contract of
employment had never been made and may recover the reasonable value of the services performed even though such reasonable value exceeds the contract price.'' That statement is
quoted with approval in Neblett v. Getty, supra, 20 Cal..App.
2d 65, 70 (dictum). 'l'he same is said in Laiblin v. San
Joaquin Agr. Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App. 516, quoting with
approval from sections 1459, sttpm, and 1485 of Williston
on Contracts. (See also Adams v. Burbank, 103 Cal. 646 [37
P. 640] ; Gray v. Bekins, 186 Cal. 389 [199 P. 767] ; Tubbs
c;:,c,uL'wcc•,
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v. Delillo, 19 CaLApp. 612
; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 313;
109 A.L.R. 674.) [5] Of course the contract
is competent evidence bearing on the reasonable value of the services. (Adarns v.
CaL 646; Kimes v.
Davidson Inv. Co., 101
P.
; Rest.
§ 347, Corn.
It is true that in the
598), the trial court found
express contract of
employment of the
but in
affirming the judgment for reasonable value of the services
the District Court of Appeal as one of its
and in
making the above quoted
assumed that there was
an express contract fixing the fees. In Elconin v. Yalen, 208
Cal. 546 (282 P. 791], there was involved a case where the
fees were not stated in the contract of employment and the
court's statement that if there had been such a
it would
have "measured" the amount of recovery, was dictum. It is
not clear whether it was meant that such a contract would be
only evidence of the amount or the conclusive measure. Moreover it cited for its dictum Kirk v.
supra, 202 Cal. 501,
and Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621
P. 796], which merely
held that where an attorney is wrongfully discharged under
a partially performed contract he may sue for damages for the
breach and in a proper case the full contract price may be
the measure of damages. The same is true of Denio v. City
of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal.2d 580 [140 P.2d 392, 149
A.L.R. 320], and Zurich G. A. & L. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler,
12 Cal.2d 98 [81 P.2d 913].
[6] Inherent in the right to plead by common count in
quantum meruit where the employee has partly performed
but has been prevented from full
the employer's repudiation of the contract, is the principle that
he need not plead the contract or its repudiation and his
rescission of it. There are cases indicating that those special
facts should be pleaded (see Roche v. Baldwin, 135 Cal. 522
[65 P. 459, 67 P. 903]; 5 Cal.Jur.2d, Assumpsit, § 9; 14 So.
Cal.L.Rev. 288) but the well established rule is that a common count declaration is sufficient under the circumstances
above mentioned. (See authorities cited supra; 5 Cal.Jur.2d
Assumpsit, §§ 10, 11, 12, 22, 25; 14 So.Cal.Il.Rev. 288.)
[7] A common count may be used where the only thing that
remains to be done is the payment of money. (O'Connor v.
Dingley, 26 Cal. 11; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250 [23
P. 127] ; Donegan v. Houston, 5 Cal.App. 626 [90 P. 1073].)
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In the instant case an that remained to
of the amount still due on the contract as it
\Yas the
its terms after
trial of the divorce action.
further be noted that under the
evidence
on the
above
in effect promptly
notified Campbell of the rescission of the contract when he
advised him that he would execute the substitution of attorneys when he was
but told
bell he ·would hold him
[8] On the issue of the
of restoration or offer to
restore the part
for the services which
had
made, the rule
that such restoration is not necessary
where plaintiff would be entitled to it in any event. (See
]{ales v. Houghton, 190 Cal. 294 [212 P. 21]; Silvey v. Fink,
99 Cal.App. 528 [279 P. 202] ; JYJitchell v. Samnels, 39 Cal.
App. 134 [178 P. 336]; Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal.App.2d 82
[212 P.2d 946, 213 P.2d 788]; Rest. Contracts, § 349.) It is
clear that plaintiff was entitled to receive the $450 paid to
him either under the contract or for the reasonable value of his
scrYiccs.
The question remains, ho1vever, of the application of the
foregoing rules to the instant case. Plaintiff had performed
practically all of the services he was employed to perform
when he was discharged. The trial was at an end. The
court had indicated its intention to give judgment against
Campbell and all that remained was the signing of findings
and judgment. The full sum called for in the contract was
payable because the trial had ended. [9] Under these circumstances it would appear that in effect, plaintiff had completed the performance of his services and the rule would
apply that: "The remedy of restitution in money is not available to one who has fully performed his part of a contract,
if the only part of the agreed exchange for such performance
that has not been rendered by the defendant is a sum of money
constituting a liquidated debt; but full performance does not
make restitution unavailable if any part of the consideration
due from the defendant in return is something other than a
liquidated debt." (Hest. Contracts, § 350; Locke v. Duchesnay,
84 Cal.App. 448 [258 P. 418] ; Willett & Burr v. Alpert, 181
Cal. 652 [185 P. 976]; Williston on Contracts (rev.ed.),
§ 1459; Corbin on Contracts, § 1110;
Code, § 3302.) In
such cases he recovers the full eontract price and no more.
As we have seen, as far as pleading is concerned, however,
the action may be stated as a common count other than a

307
contract. Here plaintiff alleged
indebtedness on defendant's
for services performed
of a reasonable value of $10,000 of which only
had been
[10] While it may have been more
appropriate for him to have alleged that the price of such
services was the contract
any deficiency of the pleaddefendant's answer
forth that
is eliminated
factor. Plaintiff's action can thus be said to be common count
inckbitatus
and there
no dispute as to the
amount called for in the contract, the services having been
in effect fully performed, the court should have rendered
for the balance due on the contract which is conceded
be $300.
The judgment is therefore reversed and the trial court
directed to render judgment in favor of plaintiff for the
sum of $300.
Shenk, Acting C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, .J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. I agree with a great deal of
the discussion in the majority opinion, and even to a larger
extent with the authorities therein cited, relative to the rules
of law which should govern this case but I think this court
misapplies the very rules it cites.
Specifically, I think this court errs when it says "there
no dispute as to the amount called for in the contract,
the services having been in effect fully performed, the court
should have rendered judgment for the balance due on the
contract which is conceded to be $300.'' 'I' he foregoing statement is neither supported faetually by the record nor legally
the authorities cited.
Upon the record and the authorities the judgment should
be reversed and the cause remanded either (a) with directions
to the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000
(b) for a retrial upon all issues. I would prefer to end
the litigation by adopting alternative (a) and in my view
the record fully justifies that disposition of the cause. Directed to that conclusion is the succinctly stated opinion preby Justice Vallee when the cause was before the District Court of Appeal (reported at (Cal.App.) pp. 932-933.
265 P .2d) and I adopt it as a most worthy presentation of
the views which I think should prevail:
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be reto render judg:l'ound that the
services
by plaintiff is
witness who testified concerning
The
of this court
of
with respect to
toto in the margin. 1 I think
any discussion with Dr. Campbell
of that contract sometime after
and about the time that you
drawn by Mr. Shoemaker for
for plaintiff].
with Dr. Campbell about that time
What was said 9 .
A. Dr. Campbell came into my office and
he was dissatisfied with the announced judgment of the court.
Mrs. Campbell should have been allowed nothing in way
told Dr. Campbell thnt :1fter 28 years of married life and
~""n""'h' and his earning capacity that I thought the least the
eourt
allowed would have been possibly $250.00 a month.
'' 'He nlso stated to me at that time that he was dissatis:fied with the
amendments that I had
on the :findings of fact and
of law because he
findings should state in there
that J\lr. Shoemaker had suborned and bribed certain witnesses for the
plaintiff.
'' 'I told Dr.
that there was no evidence of any such action
on the
Mr. ;::;r•o~·m:1K13r and that I was not going to submit to
in that regard.
if I wouldn't run this case the way he
me, aud asked me if I would sign a
suLstitution of attorneys. I
him that I recognized that he had the
power to discharge me as his attorney, that I was prepared to carry the
case
to a conelusion, and I thought the case would be reversed on
added.]
appeal.
" 'He said "
' he wanted to act as his own attorney, so he could
argue the
findings himself; and with that I prepared the substitution
which is in the file, and Dr. Campbell signed it
and I signed it.
'' 'He left the office carrying the files of this case, the divorce case,
and also the file of the Municipal Court case with him, and that is the
substance of the conversation.
'' 'Q. You turned over to Dr. Campbell at that time all of the :files
in
Campbell? A. The two cases.
And
other case that is, the case in the Municipal CourU
A. The entire file.
'' 'Q. You have had nothing to do with the case from that time until
no-.:d A. I have not.
'' 'Q. J\Ir. Oliver, will you look in the file of Campbell against Camphell, Number D370,670, and find the substitution to which you have just
referred? A. Here it is.
'' 'Q. This substitution which you have presented to me appears to
have been signed by Dr. Campbell, January 25, 1951, and by John Oliver
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no reasonable conclusion can be drawn from
than that the discharge amounts to
clear
h"·""'"nr.n of the contract in its
tiff is entitled to recover the
The contract
did not limit his services
the trial
Under the contract he
until final judgment, and he told the
the case would be reversed on
the eYidence will be no different on a retrial.
witness who can
Campbell is dead. Plaintiff is the
account of Ralph D. Paonessa and John Oliver on ihe same day~
A. That is correct.
"'Q. That is Dr. Campbell's signature~ A. That is Dr. Campbell's
signature; he signed that in my presence; and that is
" 'Q. That reads: "Defendant and
stitntes himself Roy Campbell in pro.
plare of Ralph D. Paonessa and .John
" 'and under that: "Vie eon sent to the nboYc substitution, dated:
.January 25, 1951."
'' 'Then on the other page there is another signature of. Dr. Campbell
above ''substitution accepted.'' A. That is correct.
'' 'Q. Did you have any conversation at that time with Dr. Campbell
about compensation? A. Yes, I told him that I expected to be paid the
reasonable value . • .
" ' (Continuing) That I expected to be
a reasonable value for
my services. He says: "What do
think
reasonable value of your
services are~" I said, "I
to be paid as much as nir. Shoemaker.'' . . .
'' 'Q. When you told Dr. Campbell that you expected to be
and
you expected to be paid approximately, or the same amount
was
allowed Mr. Shoemaker wlmt did Dr. Campbell say~ A. He said, "I
am not going to pay you a cent more.'' ' ''
2
"
'The contract reads:
''December 16th, 1949
" 'We, the undersigned do hereby agree to
Roy
in an action for separate maintenance instituted
wife, Iva
Campbell and on cross-complaint for diYorce
Campbell
against his wife, and which has been set for trial for
20th,
1950 in Department 1 of the Superior Court of the County
Los
Angeles State of California for a total fee of $750.00
Court Costs
and other incidentals in the sum of $100.00 making a
snm of $850.00.
Said fees of $7 50.00 to be pa \d after trial.
" 'Ralph D. Paonessa
'' 'J olm Oliver
" 'I accept the serYices of Ralph D. Paonessa and Jolm Oliver as
per above agreement.
""The court fails to state that in 4 uv~<.nncwJrc;
asking him with respect to tho
defendant's attorney
Paonessa on the
under section 1880 of the
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to the conversation. There is
in plaintiff's
testimony to impugn his
He did all any lawyer of
the highest professional
could have done under
the conditions. Defendant waived plaintiff's disqualification
under the dead man's
(Deacon v. Bryans, 212
Cal. 87, 90-93 [298 P.
Defendant will be unable to
of the
of plainmake any showing to the
the
should be retiff. Under these
versed with directions as I have indicated. (Conner v.
.) "
Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 229, 232 (259 P.2d
Dooling, J. pro

concurred.

A. No. 23175.

In Bank.

July 30, 1954.]

DOROTHY C. DAWSON, as Special Administratrix, etc.,
et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES R. GOFF et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Code Civ. Proc., § 395,
subd. 1, relating· to venue in contract actions, requires that
all actions arising on contract shall be tried in county in which
defendant resides or in which contract was made, unless defendant has contracted specially and in writing as to county
in which his obligation is to be performed, in which event such
county is also a proper county for trial of action.
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-As regards question of venue,
obligation of contract is incurred at time contract is made,
and obligations under it arise and arc incurred in county in
which it is made.
[3] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 395,
subd. 1, rdating to yenue in contract actions, county where
contract is made is deemed to be county where it is to be
performed unless there is a special written contract to the
contrary.
[4] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Questions of Law.
-Whether letter written by defendants to plaintiff in which
they "agree" to purchase certain corporate stock from plaintiff on demand and on which plaintiff's sig·nature appears after
notation "Accepted," or whether plaintiff's subsequent written
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue,§ 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Venue,§ 19 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12, 14] Venue, § 26; [4] Corporations, § 306; [5] Corporations, § 305; [6-11, 13) Contracts, § 17.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

